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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE SHADOW OF STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS LAWS: A CASE STUDY
BY
ALEXANDRA B. KLASS*

This Article looks at the relationship between state environmental
rights statutes and the common law public trust doctrine. In addressing this
issue, it focuses on the state of Minnesota, where, in the early 1970s, the
state legislature enacted a far-reaching environmental rights statute, the
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), that served to codify many
public trust principles. Beginning in the early 1970s and for the next forty
years, litigants in Minnesota that might otherwise have brought common law
public trust doctrine claims for environmental protection purposes instead
channeled that litigation through MERA. As a result, Minnesota courts have
rarely been asked to interpret or use the common law public trust doctrine
at all in the context of environmental protection. And, more importantly,
they did not have an opportunity to use and develop the doctrine during the
time the environmental protection movement was at its height in the 1970s
and early 1980s. Instead, the lyrical language many courts used in public
trust doctrine cases in other states during that era to protect natural
resources and expand the scope of the doctrine is found, in Minnesota, in
MERA cases, not in public trust doctrine cases. This Article explores the
implications of the underuse of the common law public trust doctrine in
Minnesota by focusing on a 2012 case, White Bear Lake Restoration
Association v. Department of Natural Resources, which is the first case to
begin a new conversation on the common law public trust doctrine in the
state—one that never took place in the 1970s. This case involves traditional
public trust resources—a lake and a lakebed—as well as efforts by private
citizens to compel the state to protect those resources for present and future
generations, thus coming squarely within the purview of MERA and even the
most narrow reading of the public trust doctrine. The state argued in part
that MERA had replaced the common law public trust doctrine in Minnesota
* Distinguished McKnight University Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I received
very helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article from Robin Craig, John Echeverria,
Robert Glicksman, Richard Lazarus, Nathaniel Moore, Kevin Reuther, Melissa Scanlan, Byron
Starns, and Matthew Seltzer. Professor Klass was a consultant to the attorneys for the plaintiff
White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Association in White Bear Lake Restoration Association v.
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources. The views expressed in this Article are those
solely of Professor Klass and not of White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Association or their
attorneys.
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and that the doctrine on its own could not be used for environmental
protection purposes, citing the lack of any relevant public trust doctrine
cases. While the district court rejected these contentions, the arguments of
the parties and the court’s analysis sheds light on the important relationship
between the common law and state legislation in the context of public trust
resources and environmental protection.
I.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1970s and early 1980s were heady times for environmental law and
its supporters. Congress enacted the most sweeping federal protections for
natural resources, human health, and the environment ever seen then or
since in the form of the Clean Air Act,1 the Clean Water Act,2 and a host of
other federal statutes. President Nixon created the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).3 There was a national conversation about the need
to preserve natural resources and protect human health, even if it placed
new and significant limits on industrial activities as well as commercial and
residential development. At the same time, a similar conversation and
related legal developments were taking place in state legislatures. In the late
1970s and early 1980s many states enacted new laws to protect air, water,
and open space that built on the new federal environmental laws and
created new state agencies to administer them.4
But there was another, related conversation occurring in academia and,
ultimately, in the state courts over a different approach to protecting natural
resources—the use of the public trust doctrine. The public trust doctrine is
an ancient Roman law doctrine which provides that states must hold certain
natural resources, particularly submerged lands under tidal and navigable

1

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
3 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2012).
4 See, e.g., Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 578–85 (2001) (describing state environmental protection
legislation from the pre-1970 era through the 1990s).
2
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waters, in trust for the use and benefit of the public and future generations.5
Prior to 1970, U.S. courts limited application of the doctrine primarily to
cases involving efforts to preserve public access to water resources for
commerce, recreation, transportation, and fishing.6 In 1970, however, Joseph
Sax argued in an influential law review article that the public trust doctrine
could be an alternative and complementary means of forcing state agency
officials to protect natural resources even when strong environmental
protection legislation did not require such action or provide standing to
those who wished to protect natural resources.7 Environmental groups and
individuals took up the call to arms and convinced courts in many states to
adopt a more expansive use of the public trust doctrine to protect a broad
range of natural resources. Excellent legal scholarship has catalogued the
number and range of cases over the years and serves to emphasize just how
important a role the common law public trust doctrine has become in the
past several decades.8
The rise of environmental protection statutes coupled with the
increasing use of the public trust doctrine led to yet another strand of legal
developments that combined the legislative and common law advances.
First, several states amended their constitutions in the 1970s and included
provisions declaring that the citizens of the state have the right to clean air,
pure water, and the preservation of natural resources; these provisions also
declare that the government has an obligation to protect those resources for
its citizens and future generations.9 Second, Professor Sax worked with the
Michigan legislature to create an environmental rights statute, the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act,10 that grants private citizens the right to sue
the government and other private parties to ensure the protection of natural
resources even where other substantive environmental protection statutes
did not provide such a right of action.11 A few other states followed suit,
most notably Minnesota, which in 1971 enacted the Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act (MERA).12 Modeled after the Michigan statute,
MERA grants any private party, state, or local government the right to sue
for declaratory or injunctive relief to protect air, water, land, or other natural
5 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970) (summarizing the history of the public trust

doctrine).
6 See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (stating that the scope of the
public trust doctrine was traditionally defined in terms of navigation, commerce, and fisheries
but also noting that the doctrine is sufficiently flexible “to encompass changing needs”).
7 Sax, supra note 5.
8 MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW xxi–xxx (2013) (table of secondary sources
listing approximately 200 scholarly articles on the public trust doctrine).
9 See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 714–15 (2006).
10 Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of 1970, 1970
Mich. Pub. Act 127, repealed by 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 451. Today the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act is codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 324.1701–.1706 (West 2012).
11 See Klass, supra note 9, at 721.
12 MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01–13 (2014).
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resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction.13 Even more than the
Michigan statute, litigants in Minnesota have successfully used MERA to
protect a broad range of natural resources, and to enjoin or limit a
significant number of industrial, commercial, and residential development
activities that would adversely impact protected natural resources.14 While
other states enacted environmental rights statutes in the 1970s, very few
have resulted in any significant case law and none as extensive as that in
Minnesota.15
The question for this Article is one that, to my knowledge, has not been
addressed in the extensive literature on the public trust doctrine. The
question is whether environmental rights statutes can stunt the growth of
the common law public trust doctrine and how this can be avoided if, in fact,
it should be avoided. While there may not be easy answers to this question, a
recent case in Minnesota provides some helpful insights into what happens
to the common law public trust doctrine when forty years of environmental
litigation that would otherwise rely on the public trust doctrine is instead
channeled into a fairly robust environmental rights statute. At least in
Minnesota, the courts were not asked to interpret or use the public trust
doctrine at all in the context of environmental protection.16 And, more
importantly, they were not asked to use and develop the doctrine during the
time the environmental protection movement was at its height—in the 1970s
and early 1980s.17 During this era, courts in other states used the public trust
doctrine to protect natural resources and gradually expanded the scope of
that doctrine, while Minnesota courts used MERA to increase protection for
environmental resources instead of strengthening the public trust doctrine.
In fact, there are very few public trust doctrine cases involving
environmental protection to be found in the state after 1970—an oddity
considering the state’s history of strong environmental protection in other
areas such as its enactment of MERA, the courts’ early expansive
interpretation of that law, and the enactment of other 1970s-era
environmental protection laws.
However, in 2012, a Minnesota case, White Bear Lake Restoration
Association v. Department of Natural Resources (White Bear Lake
Restoration Association),18 began a new conversation on the public trust
doctrine in the state—one that never took place in the 1970s. This case
involves traditional public trust resources—a lake and a lakebed—as well as
efforts by private citizens to compel the state to protect those resources for
present and future generations, thus coming squarely within the purview of

13
14
15
16
17

Id. § 116B.01.
See Klass, supra note 9, at 722–24 (comparing case law in Minnesota and Michigan).
See id. at 725 (summarizing the law in states with similar statutes).
Id. at 713.
Id. at 706–07.

18 Settlement Agreement, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res.,
No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 16, 2014).
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MERA and even the most narrow reading of the public trust doctrine.19 The
state argued in part that MERA had replaced the common law public trust
doctrine in Minnesota and that the doctrine on its own could not be used for
environmental protection purposes, citing the lack of any relevant public
trust doctrine cases.20 While the district court rejected these contentions,21
the arguments of the parties and the court’s analysis sheds light on the
important relationship between the common law and state legislation in the
context of public trust resources and environmental protection more
generally.
Part II of this Article provides a brief history of the common law public
trust doctrine, its expansion to more broadly protect natural resources in the
1970s, and its role in creating the constitutional and statutory environmental
rights provisions that exist in some states, including Minnesota, today. Part
III explores MERA and the White Bear Lake Restoration Association case in
detail to show how the channeling of environmental protection litigation
toward MERA for forty years created a situation where there is very little
public trust doctrine case law to rely on in the state.
Part IV considers the implications of this lack of case law surrounding
the public trust doctrine in Minnesota. Even if MERA does not displace the
common law public trust doctrine in Minnesota, is it an adequate substitute?
If a statute exists, is there a need for the common law doctrine? This Part
contends that the common law public trust doctrine remains important
despite the existence of MERA. First, the public trust doctrine has an
important role in natural resource protection in the state because of various
exemptions and affirmative defenses in the statute. Second, the public trust
doctrine provides an important defense to regulatory takings claims when
governmental entities act to protect natural resources in a manner that
conflicts with private property rights. MERA cannot provide this support for
state action and the public trust doctrine has a long history of playing just
such a role. Third, and perhaps most important, the public trust doctrine
remains important as an ultimate check on legislative and executive branch
authority in the context of natural resources protection. Legislatures can
amend statutes to provide less protection for natural resources. And courts
must give deference under administrative law principles to agencies
interpreting statutes and regulations, and that deference may result in

19 See Complaint at 6, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Apr. 10,
2013). See also infra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (describing scope of the traditional
public trust doctrine); infra notes 61–79 (describing scope of MERA).
20 See Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for
Summary Judgment at 17, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (May 1, 2014);
Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at
23–24, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Apr. 7, 2014).
21 See Summary Judgment Order Memorandum at 17, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n,
No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Aug. 29, 2014) (rejecting the state’s arguments and granting summary
judgment to Homeowners’ Association regarding whether the public trust doctrine affords a
common law cause of action).
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reduced protection for natural resources.22 But the public trust doctrine is a
vehicle for the courts to ensure that the state fulfills its common law
obligation to protect natural resources even if legislative and executive
branch sentiments are otherwise.23
Notably, in focusing on the relationship between MERA and the
common law public trust doctrine in Minnesota, the goal of this Article is not
at all to criticize MERA or to argue that litigants should ignore it in favor of
bringing common law public trust doctrine claims. To the contrary, the
Minnesota legislature in 1971 enacted powerful, far-reaching, and thoughtful
legislation that has played a major role in protecting natural resources in the
state since that time. The legislature also included a strong savings clause to
ensure that MERA did not replace existing legal rights and remedies,
including common law rights and remedies then in existence or that might
develop in the future.24 Instead, the goal in this Article is to explore how the
case law has developed in Minnesota and to encourage litigants in future
cases to use the common law in efforts to protect the environment so a more
robust common law jurisprudence can develop alongside judicial decisions
interpreting MERA.
In a 1986 article on the public trust doctrine, Professor Richard Lazarus
warned environmental protection advocates and scholars not to place too
much emphasis on the common law public trust doctrine lest it undermine
efforts to create new natural resource protection frameworks through
legislative and regulatory action.25 This was good advice at the time, when
federal and state agencies and courts were in the process of creating a
massive body of new regulations and case law interpreting and expanding
the new environmental protection statutes enacted in the 1970s. And it may
well remain good advice today. But the problem also exists in reverse. Too
much emphasis on statutes can cause the common law to stagnate, and this
can be particularly problematic if it happens at a critical time in history,
when courts are in the process of developing a new rhetoric surrounding the
protection of natural resources and the relationship between humans and
the environment. As shown below, this appears to be what happened in
Minnesota, particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, the Minnesota
experience with the public trust doctrine is in some ways a cautionary tale.
But, as the White Bear Lake Restoration Association litigation illustrates, the

22 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.”); see also Mark
A. Latham, (Un)Restoring the Chemical, Physical, and Biological Integrity of Our Nation’s
Waters: The Emerging Clean Water Act Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
411, 447 (2010) (arguing that the modern Supreme Court has used the concept of administrative
deference “as a sword to limit environmental protection”).
23 See, e.g., Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View
into the Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 131 (2012) (discussing states’ obligations under
the public trust doctrine).
24 Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.12 (West 2014).
25 Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 674–76 (1986).
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problem can be partially if not completely remedied through good lawyering
and courts recognizing that statutes can inform but do not replace common
law doctrine when it comes to natural resource protection.
II. THE MODERN PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
The public trust doctrine is an ancient Roman law doctrine that
provides that states must hold certain natural resources, most notably
submerged lands under tidal and navigable waters, in trust for the use and
benefit of the public and future generations.26 Along those lines, the U.S.
Supreme Court first articulated the parameters of the public trust doctrine in
1892, in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois (Illinois Central).27 In
that case, the Court held that the Illinois legislature did not possess the
authority to sell over 1,000 acres underlying Lake Michigan in the Chicago
Harbor to the Illinois Central Railroad because these submerged lands were
owned under a “title held in trust for the people of the State that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private
parties.”28 Although the state could allow some private economic use of such
lands, the uses must be ones that “do not substantially impair the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining.”29 The Court stressed that the title
to these lands was “different in character” from other state lands which
could be sold into private ownership and also different than “the title which
the United States holds in the public lands which are open to preemption
and sale.”30
U.S. courts generally limited application of the public trust doctrine to
submerged lands under navigable waters for the decades that followed, but
that began to change in the 1970s. In a very influential law review article
written in 1970, Joseph Sax, at that time a Professor at the University of
Michigan Law School, argued that the public trust doctrine could be a
vehicle to compel state and local governments to protect water and other
natural resources from development and other threats.31 Since that time,
many state courts such as those in California, Hawaii, New York, and
Louisiana have developed a robust common law public trust doctrine for a
broad range of environmental protection purposes,32 while most other states
have at least used the doctrine as a check on government or private action

26

Sax, supra note 5, at 475.
146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
28 Id. at 452.
27
29
30
31

Id.
Id.

Sax, supra note 5, at 473–74.
Klass, supra note 9, at 735 (discussing broad application of the public trust doctrine in
Hawaii); see infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (describing public trust doctrine cases in
California, Louisiana, and New York).
32

12_TO JCI.KLASS (DO NOT DELETE)

5/14/2015 2:52 PM

438

[Vol. 45:431

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

that would limit public access to shoreline, fishing, or other commercial or
recreational water-based resources.33
For instance, the California courts have found that the common law
public trust doctrine requires government regulators to take into account the
impacts of surface water withdrawals that harm lakes; wind turbines that
may kill raptors such as eagles, hawks, and falcons; and groundwater
withdrawals that adversely impact connected surface waters.34 In Louisiana,
courts have used the doctrine to limit the construction and operation of a
hazardous waste disposal facility in addition to using it to protect more
traditional public trust resources such as oyster beds.35 In New York, courts
have held that the doctrine protects parkland in addition to traditional
water-based resources.36 With regard to water-based resources, in the face of
rapidly depleting surface and groundwater resources in many parts of the
country, litigants have used the public trust doctrine successfully to place
limits on state agencies that would otherwise continue to grant water
appropriation permits to private developers and local governments.37 While
the California Supreme Court’s famous Mono Lake case in 1983 may be the
most well-known use of the public trust doctrine for this purpose,38 there

33 See generally Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENV. L.
REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Eastern Comparative Guide]; Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to
the Western Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State
Summaries, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) [hereinafter Western Comparative Guide].
34 See Nat’l Audobon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 711–12 (Cal. 1983); Ctr. for

Biological Diversity v. FPL Group, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Holly Doremus,

Groundwater and the Public Trust Doctrine, California Style, LEGAL PLANET, July 21, 2014,
http://legal-planet.org/2014/07/21/groundwater-and-the-public-trust-doctrine-california-style/
(reporting on California trial court decision in July 2014 holding that groundwater pumping that
affects flows in a navigable stream are subject to the public trust doctrine).
35 See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1159–60 (La. 1984)
(recognizing that that the public trust doctrine imposes a duty on state actors to provide
meaningful review of the impact of their decisions on natural resources and the environment);
Ryan M. Seidemann, The Public Trust Doctrine and Surface Water Management and
Conservation: A View from Louisiana, 40th Annual Conference on Environmental Law,
American Bar Association—Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources (Mar. 18, 2011).
(discussing potential impacts of public trust doctrine on development of shale resources in
Louisiana).
36 See, e.g., Matter of Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 31145/056 (Dec. 20,
2013) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and holding that development of a
composting facility in a park violates the common law public trust doctrine and citing earlier
similar cases).
37 See Doremus, supra note 34 (detailing the California trial court decision that
groundwater removals affecting flows in a navigable stream are subject to the public trust
doctrine); see also Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Dept. of Natural Res., 799 N.W.2d 73, 92 (Wis.
2011) (holding that the state Department of Natural Resources was required to consider
environmental impact of a proposed high-capacity well under the public trust doctrine when
presented with sufficient potential harm to waters of the state).
38 See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983) (“The public trust
doctrine serves the function in that integrated system of preserving the continuing sovereign
power of the state to protect public trust uses . . . .”).
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have been high-profile cases decided in more recent years in California,
Wisconsin, and other states.39
Excellent journal articles and books in recent years have detailed the
use and expansion of the public trust doctrine for environmental protection
purposes in all fifty states.40 This writing illustrates how litigants have now
used the public trust doctrine for over four decades in efforts to protect
traditional water-based resources as well as, in some states, public lands,
parks, shoreland and beaches, the atmosphere, animals, and plant species.41
However, it is important to keep in mind that in the majority of states, the
public trust doctrine remains limited to navigable waters and submerged
lands and has not been extended beyond access to and use of those
resources.42
Notably, the modern public trust doctrine does more than simply place
limits on governmental action or inaction with regard to protected public
trust resources. Instead, courts in many states have also relied on the public
trust doctrine to support government actions to protect the environment by
refusing to grant a permit or enacting new regulations to limit development
that will harm natural resources.43 In this category of cases, instead of a
plaintiff suing the government for violation of the public trust doctrine, a
private party is suing the government for a “taking” of private property
without just compensation or for acting in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, and the governmental entity argues, often successfully, that the
property in question is subject to and thus limited by the public trust
doctrine.44
The expansion and use of the common law public trust doctrine has
influenced more than just common law doctrine. Also in the 1970s, many
states amended their constitutions, adding public trust language. For
instance, in 1971, Pennsylvania amended its state constitution to provide:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the

39 See Scanlan, supra note 23, at 139 (detailing the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in
Lake Buelah Mgmt. Dist.); BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 8, at 165–77; see also Lake Beulah Mgmt.
Dist., 799 N.W.2d at 92.
40 See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 8, at xxi–xxx (table of secondary sources listing

approximately 200 scholarly articles on the public trust doctrine).
41 See id.; Craig, Eastern Comparative Guide, supra note 33; Craig, Western Comparative
Guide, supra note 33; see also BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 8, at 349–56 (discussing lawsuits
urging courts to include the atmosphere as a public trust resource in order to address climate
change); see infra text accompanying note 100 (discussing Our Children’s Trust lawsuit in
Minnesota).
42 Western Comparative Guide, supra note 33, at 56 (explaining the public trust doctrine
“outlines public and private rights in water and submerged lands”); Eastern Comparative Guide,
supra note 33, at 4 (same).
43 See Klass, supra note 9, at 734–42 (discussing cases in various states where courts
upheld state or local regulatory action in the face of takings claims and other challenges based
in whole or in part on the public trust doctrine).
44

Id.
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people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
45
people.

It was this constitutional provision that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court relied upon in 2013 to strike down a state statute preventing local
governments from limiting hydraulic fracturing activities within their
jurisdictions.46
Likewise, Montana amended its constitution in 1974 and included
provisions that granted an “inalienable” right to a “clean and healthful
environment” and placed a duty on the state and private parties to “maintain
and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and
future generations.”47 Montana courts have relied on these constitutional
provisions to hold that a nonprofit group could sue the state environmental
agency and a mining company to prevent discharge of contaminants to a
river that would adversely impact water quality and species, even though the
agency’s rules allowed the discharge.48
A few state legislatures also enacted new laws beginning in the 1970s
reflecting developing common law public trust principles.49 In Michigan,
Professor Sax worked with the Michigan legislature to draft the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act.50 According to Sax, the law had three
purposes: 1) creating an enforceable legal right held by the public to a
“decent environment”; 2) making that right “enforceable by private citizens”
suing as members of the public; and 3) setting the groundwork for a
“common law of environmental quality” by leaving the terms pollution,
environmental quality, and public trust undefined to allow courts to develop
a common law approach to the problem and create flexible solutions.51
In 1971, the Minnesota legislature enacted MERA,52 modeled after the
Michigan law, which gives any person the right to seek declaratory and
injunctive relief in court against any person as necessary to “protect the air,
water, land, or other natural resources” in the state whether publicly or
privately owned from “pollution, impairment or destruction.”53 “Natural
resources” include but are not limited to “all mineral, animal, botanical, air,
water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and historical resources” as

45

PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013).
47 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; id. at art. IX, § 1.
48 Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249 (Mont. 1999).
49 See Klass, supra note 9, at 721–25 (discussing state environmental rights statutes); Susan
George et al., The Public in Action: Using State Citizen Suit Statutes to Protect Biodiversity, 6 U.
BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 14–20 & app. A (1997) (summarizing environmental rights statutes).
50 Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.1701–.1706 (West
2012); Klass, supra note 9, at 721.
51 JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN ACTION 248
(1972).
52 Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01–.13 (West 2014).
53 Id. § 116B.07.
46
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well as state-owned scenic and aesthetic resources.54 Minnesota courts have
interpreted MERA broadly to protect birds, trees, historic buildings, marsh
and wetland areas, quietude in residential areas, drinking water wells,
wetlands, and the wilderness experience in forests.55 Litigants have used
MERA successfully to enjoin actions by the state, local governments, and
private parties that would harm the environment and to compel action to
protect the environment.56
By the late 1990s, approximately fifteen states had distinct
environmental rights statutes—as opposed to citizen suit provisions to
enforce various state environmental protection laws.57 However, only in
Minnesota have courts regularly used the statute to protect natural
resources beyond what state environmental protection laws already
mandate.58 Indeed, even the Michigan statute on which MERA was modeled
has not had as much success as MERA in creating a statutory vehicle to
promote Sax’s vision for developing the common law public trust doctrine.59
This is primarily because Michigan courts have been less generous on
standing to sue than the Minnesota courts, thus defeating one of Sax’s main
goals for the law.60
III. THE MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT AND WHITE BEAR LAKE
RESTORATION ASSOCIATION V. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
This Part explores MERA in more detail to show how it codifies various
aspects of the public trust doctrine, expands on particular aspects of the
doctrine, but also includes limits and defenses not found in the common law
public trust doctrine. This Part then discusses the White Bear Lake
Restoration Association case to provide a case study of what happens when
a court is faced with a public trust doctrine claim to protect a traditional
public trust doctrine resource—a lake—but has virtually no case law,
positive or negative, to help resolve the claim.

A. MERA and Cases Applying MERA
As discussed in Part I, MERA is the most robust of the state
environmental rights statutes enacted in the 1970s to provide a statutory
vehicle to advance Professor Sax’s goals for the public trust doctrine.
Indeed, the “purpose” section of MERA states:

54

Id. § 116B.02.
Klass, supra note 9, at 722.
56 Id. at 722–23.
57 Klass, supra note 9, at 725.
58 See Klass, supra note 9, at 722–25 (discussing limited application of state environmental
rights statutes by the courts in states other than Minnesota); see also George et al., supra note
55

49, at 16–20 (discussing judicial limitations placed on private rights of action, defendants
subject to suit, and remedies in most of the states with environmental rights statutes).
59 Klass, supra note 9, at 723–25.
60 Id. at 723.
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The legislature finds and declares that each person is entitled by right to
the protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, and other
natural resources located within the state and that each person has the
responsibility to contribute to the protection, preservation, and enhancement
thereof. The legislature further declares its policy to create and maintain
within the state conditions under which human beings and nature can exist in
productive harmony in order that present and future generations may enjoy
clean air and water, productive land, and other natural resources with which
this state has been endowed. Accordingly, it is in the public interest to provide
an adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land and other natural resources
61
located within the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction.

Section 116B.03 provides that any person may maintain a civil action in
state district court for declaratory or injunctive relief in the name of the
State of Minnesota against any person “for the protection of the air, water,
land, or other natural resources located within the state, whether publicly or
privately owned, from pollution, impairment, or destruction.”62 MERA
defines “natural resources” as including but not limited to “all mineral,
animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and
historical resources,” as well as any “[s]cenic and esthetic resources . . .
when owned by any governmental unit or agency.”63 MERA defines
“pollution, impairment, or destruction” as 1) any conduct that “violates, or is
likely to violate, any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order,
license, stipulation agreement, or permit of the state or any instrumentality,
agency, or political subdivision thereof”; or 2) any conduct that “materially
adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the
environment.”64 With regard to determining what conduct “materially
adversely affects” or “is likely to materially adversely affect” the
environment, Minnesota courts apply a five-factor test adapted from a
Michigan court interpreting its own environmental rights statute.65 The
factors are:

61

Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 (West 2014).

62

Id. § 116B.03, subdiv. 1. MERA excludes family farms and family farm corporations from
the definition of “persons” who can be sued under MERA. Id. § 116B.02, subdiv. 2. See also Cnty.
of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 294–95 (Minn. 1973) for a discussion of the family farm
exemption. Within seven days of filing suit, the plaintiff must serve the summons and complaint
upon the state attorney general and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and, within 21 days
of filing the suit, must publish written notice of the suit in a legal newspaper in the county in
which the suit is commenced with information on the parties, date of suit, court, the acts
complained of, and declaratory and injunctive relief requested. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03,
subdiv. 2. In any MERA suit, the attorney general may intervene as a matter of right, and other
interested parties may intervene upon permission of the court. Id. § 116B.03, subdiv. 3.
63 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02, subdiv. 4.
64 Id. § 116B.02.
65 Id. at subdiv. 5; Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) (explicitly incorporating multi-factor test from the Michigan Court of Appeals
decision in City of Portage v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 355 N.W.2d 913, 915–16 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984)).
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(1) The quality and severity of any adverse effects of the proposed action on
the natural resources affected;
(2) Whether the natural resources affected are rare, unique, endangered, or
have historical significance;
(3) Whether the proposed action will have long-term adverse effects on natural
resources, including whether the affected resources are easily replaceable (for
example, by replanting trees or restocking fish);
(4) Whether the proposed action will have significant consequential effects on
other natural resources (for example, whether wildlife will be lost if its habitat
is impaired or destroyed);
(5) Whether the affected natural resources are significantly increasing or
decreasing in number, considering the direct and consequential impact of the
66
proposed action.

According to Minnesota courts, the factors are nonexclusive and an
activity does not have to satisfy every factor to result in a materially adverse
effect on the environment.67 Instead, the factors are intended as a “flexible
guideline” based on the facts of each case.68 The courts have stated that use
of the factors recognizes the reality that “[a]lmost every human activity has
some kind of adverse impact on a natural resource” and that the purpose of
MERA was not to prohibit “virtually all human enterprise.”69
MERA goes on to provide in its “Burden of Proof” section that in any
action alleging violation of an “environmental quality standard, limitation,
rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit promulgated or issued
by the Pollution Control Agency, Department of Natural Resources,
Department of Health, or Department of Agriculture,” whenever the plaintiff
makes a prima facie showing of a violation, the defendant may rebut that
showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary.70 Likewise, in an
action where the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s
conduct is likely to “materially adversely affect the environment,” the
defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of evidence
to the contrary.71 However, in an action relying on a showing of “material
adverse effect,” the defendant may also show as an affirmative defense that
“there is no feasible and prudent alternative and the conduct at issue is
consistent with and reasonably required for promotion of the public health,
66 Schaller v. Cnty. of Blue Earth, 563 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Minn. 1997) (affirming use of
Michigan multi-factor test but modifying it for use in MERA cases). Schaller was recently
reaffirmed by Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. A11-1725,
2012 WL 2202984, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 18, 2012).
67 Schaller, 563 N.W.2d at 267.
68
69

Id.
Id. at 265 (alteration in original) (citing Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510

N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
70 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04.
71 Id. §§ 116B.02–116B.04.
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safety, and welfare in light of the state’s paramount concern for the
protection of its air, water, land and other natural resources from pollution,
impairment, or destruction.”72 The statute expressly provides that
“[e]conomic considerations alone shall not constitute a defense.”73 As a
remedy in any MERA claim under section 116B.03, the court may grant
“declaratory relief, temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may impose
such conditions upon a party as are necessary or appropriate to protect the
air, water, land or other natural resources located within the state from
pollution, impairment, or destruction.”74 The statute does not provide for
damages and does not include any provision for the court to award
attorneys’ fees or expert fees to prevailing parties.75
A separate provision of MERA, section 116B.10, provides that any
person may maintain a civil action in the district court for declaratory or
equitable relief against the state where the nature of the action is a challenge
to an environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, license,
stipulation agreement, or permit promulgated or issued by the state.76 In any
such action the plaintiff must prove the existence of material evidence
showing that the environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order,
license, stipulation agreement, or permit is inadequate to protect the air,
water, land, or other natural resources located within the state from
pollution, impairment, or destruction.77 If the plaintiff prevails under this
section, the court does not issue a declaration or injunction as it does under
section 116B.03, but instead remands the matter to the agency to make
appropriate findings.78
These provisions of MERA, taken together, give all state citizens the
ability to challenge: 1) any action that violates or may violate state
environmental permits, standards, or rules; 2) any state-issued
environmental permits, standards, or rules that are inadequate to protect
state natural resources; and 3) any actions that may materially adversely
affect the environment where no state environmental standard, rule, or
permit specifically prohibits or allows the action. Thus, MERA allows the
courts to determine, separate and apart from the legislative branch, whether
limits beyond existing environmental laws and standards should be placed
on government or private actions that may result in pollution, impairment, or
destruction of natural resources.
Significantly, the Minnesota legislature did not intend MERA to preempt
or displace any existing statutory or common law rights or remedies. MERA
explicitly states that “[t]he rights and remedies provided herein shall be in

72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. § 116B.04.
Id.
Id. §§ 116B.03, 116B.07.
See id. § 116B.07.
Id. § 116B.10, subdiv. 1.
Id. § 116B.10, subdiv. 2.
Id. § 116B.10, subdiv. 3.
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addition to any administrative, regulatory, statutory, or common law rights
and remedies now or hereafter available.”79
Since MERA’s enactment, courts have used it to protect a variety of
natural resources, including birds and the trees they nest in, the view from a
state forest and the wilderness experience in visiting the forest, quietude in
residential areas, wetlands, drinking water wells, marshes, wildlife areas,
and historic buildings.80 Courts have enjoined county highway projects, a
gravel pit, a shooting range, a radio tower on private land, tree harvesting,
and a jail, and have set a minimum lake level with an accompanying
injunction for a county to repair a dam to ensure that level is achieved.81
Notably, the language Minnesota courts used in early MERA cases
closely resembles the language courts in other states used in early common
law public trust doctrine cases to emphasize the importance of protecting
natural resources threatened by development, thus reflecting the impact of
the national environmental movement of the 1970s. For instance, in one of
the first MERA cases, County of Freeborn v. Bryson (Bryson),82 the
Minnesota Supreme Court enjoined a county from building a highway
through a wetland on private property when the owner of the property
challenged the county’s condemnation action.83 In the second of two
opinions it issued in the case, the court stated:
Times change. Until [MERA] was passed, the holder of the power of
eminent domain had in its hands almost a legislative fiat to construct a
highway wherever it wished. In the 1920’s and 1930’s, the state encouraged
highway construction to facilitate industrial expansion and transportation of
farm products to market. However, a consequence of such construction has
been the elimination or impairment of natural resources. Whether for highways
or for numerous other reasons, including agriculture, it is a well-known fact
that marshes have been drained almost indiscriminately over the past 50 years,
greatly reducing their numbers. The remaining resources will not be destroyed
so indiscriminately because the law has been drastically changed by [MERA].
Since the legislature has determined that this change is necessary, it is the duty
of the courts to support the legislative goal of protecting our environmental
resources.
....
To some of our citizens, a swamp or marshland is physically unattractive,
an inconvenience to cross by foot and an obstacle to road construction or
improvement. However, to an increasing number of our citizens who have
become concerned enough about the vanishing wetlands to seek legislative

79
80
81

Id. § 116B.12.
Klass, supra note 9, at 722 (summarizing cases).
Id. at 722–23. See also Swan Lake Area Wildlife Ass’n v. Nicollet Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 771 N.W.2d 529, 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that the county violated MERA by
allowing two wetlands to drain by failing to maintain a dam and stating that district court had
jurisdiction to set a crest elevation for the dam to remedy the impairment of natural resources).
82 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976).
83 Id. at 317.
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relief, a swamp or marsh is a thing of beauty. To one who is willing to risk wet
feet to walk through it, a marsh frequently contains a springy soft moss,
vegetation of many varieties, and wildlife not normally seen on higher ground.
It is quiet and peaceful—the most ancient of cathedrals—antedating the oldest
of manmade structures. More than that, it acts as nature’s sponge, holding
heavy moisture to prevent flooding during heavy rainfalls and slowly releasing
the moisture and maintaining the water tables during dry cycles. In short,
84
marshes and swamps are something to protect and preserve.

The court then quoted Aldo Leopold’s Sand County Almanac for the
concept of a “land ethic”—that the individual is a member of a community
with interdependent parts and that community includes soils, water, plants,
animals, and collectively, the land.85 The court concluded by stating that in
MERA, “our state legislature has given this land ethic the force of law. Our
construction of the Act gives effect to this broad remedial purpose.”86
The tone and language of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in
Bryson closely resembles some of the first modern public trust cases in the
1970s from other parts of the country. For instance, in 1972, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decided Just v. Marinette County,87 holding that a shoreland
zoning ordinance that prohibited a landowner from filling wetlands
connected to navigable waters was not a taking that required
compensation.88 The court found that the state’s “active public trust duty”
required the state to not only promote navigation but also preserve and
protect wetlands and related water resources for fishing, recreation, and
scenic beauty.89 The court stated:
This case causes us to reexamine the concepts of public benefit in contrast
to public harm and the scope of an owner’s right to use of his property. In the
instant case we have a restriction on the use of a citizens’ property, not to
secure a benefit for the public, but to prevent a harm from the change in the
natural character of the citizens’ property. We start with the premise that lakes
and rivers in their natural state are unpolluted and the pollution which now
exists is man made. The state of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty
to eradicate the present pollution and to prevent further pollution in its
navigable waters. This is not, in a legal sense, a gain or a securing of a benefit
by the maintaining of the natural status quo of the environment. What makes
this case different from most condemnation or police power zoning cases is
the interrelationship of the wetlands, the swamps and the natural environment
of shorelands to the purity of the water and to such natural resources as
navigation, fishing, and scenic beauty. Swamps and wetlands were once
considered wasteland, undesirable, and not picturesque. But as the people
became more sophisticated, an appreciation was acquired that swamps and

84
85

Id. at 321–22. See also Cnty. of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973).
Bryson, 243 N.W.2d at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing ALDO LEOPOLD, A

SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 203 (1949)).
86

Id.

87

201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).

88

Id. at 769.
Id. at 768.

89
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wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are part of the balance of nature and are
essential to the purity of the water in our lakes and streams. Swamps and
wetlands are a necessary part of the ecological creation and now, even to the
uninitiated, possess their own beauty in nature.
Is the ownership of a parcel of land so absolute that man can change its
nature to suit any of his purposes? The great forests of our state were stripped
on the theory man’s ownership was unlimited. But in forestry, the land at least
was used naturally, only the natural fruit of the land (the trees) were taken.
The despoilage was in the failure to look to the future and provide for the
reforestation of the land. An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right
to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a
purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the
rights of others. The exercise of the police power in zoning must be reasonable
and we think it is not an unreasonable exercise of that power to prevent harm
90
to public rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses.

Other public trust cases in the early 1970s in California, Illinois, and
elsewhere expressed similar ideas, reflecting the growing awareness of the
need to protect natural resources, and the importance of maintaining the
connection between humans and the natural world, even if that might stand
in the way of economic development.91
The sentiments of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bryson continued
through the decades, albeit with somewhat less urgency, and in more recent
cases applying MERA, in a similar manner to other states applying the public
trust doctrine. However, because of the early success by plaintiffs in MERA
cases, there was no real need in Minnesota to develop a modern common
law public trust doctrine. MERA provides a clear statute, with an expansive
definition of natural resources, and a direct path to injunctive relief. Indeed,
in contrast to the sixty-eight MERA decisions issued by Minnesota appellate
courts since the law’s enactment in 1971, there are only two appellate
decisions since 1970 where plaintiffs attempted to use the public trust
doctrine to protect natural resources, and the Minnesota Supreme Court did
not review either case.92 In each case, the plaintiff attempted to expand the
90 Id. at 767–68. See also supra note 37 (discussing a more recent public trust doctrine case
in Wisconsin).
91 See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 378, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the public
trust doctrine prevented a landowner from filling tidelands, and citing increasing development
pressures on natural resources, the flexibility of the public trust doctrine to encompass
changing public needs, and a growing recognition that one of the more important uses of
tidelands is “preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food
and habitat for birds and marine life”); Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 775, 780–81.
(Ill. 1977) (invalidating state senate bill conveying 200 acres under Lake Michigan to a steel
company based on the public trust doctrine and stating that “there has developed a strong,
though belated, interest in conserving natural resources and in protecting and improving our
physical environment”).
92 Larson v. Sando, 508 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Aronow v. State, No. A12–0585,
2012 WL 4476642 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012). A Westlaw search reveals two other Minnesota
cases where the term “public trust doctrine” is used, but these did not involve efforts to protect
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public trust doctrine beyond traditional water-based resources without any
compelling legal authority supporting the claim and the Minnesota courts
rejected the efforts.
In the first case, Larson v. Sando (Larson),93 the Minnesota Department
of Corrections transferred three parcels of property to the Minnesota
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), which designated the land as a
state wildlife management area.94 Some time later, DNR proposed to sell the
land to a window manufacturing company nearby in connection with the
company’s expansion of its facility.95 Neighboring landowners challenged the
sale, which the state legislature had approved, on grounds that it violated the
public trust doctrine.96 In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the case, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held in 1993 that the public trust doctrine
applies to state-owned waterways, not land. Citing earlier case law,97 the
court reasoned “[t]he state owns navigable waters and the lands under them
for public use, as trustee for the public, and not as a proprietor with right of
alienation.”98 It contrasted this public trust obligation over navigable waters
and submerged lands with other lands owned by the state, noting, “if the
doctrine applied to land, it would prohibit any sale of any state land” and it
found no support in the law for such a prohibition.99
The second case, Aronow v. State (Aronow),100 was one of the lawsuits
that Our Children’s Trust, an Oregon-based nonprofit, filed on behalf of
children against environmental protection agencies in all fifty states and
several federal agencies in 2011 alleging that these governmental entities had
violated the common law public trust doctrine by failing to limit greenhouse
gas emissions that contribute to climate change.101 In the Minnesota case, the
trial court granted the state’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed.102
In affirming the dismissal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held in an
unpublished opinion that as an intermediate appellate court, it was an errorcorrecting court and thus was without authority to change the law.103 It
reasoned that the plaintiff had provided no legal support for the argument
that the scope of the public trust doctrine should be expanded to protect the
atmosphere and the court on its own could find no supporting case law.104
or preserve natural resources. As discussed in Part III.B., infra, there are also several Minnesota
cases prior to 1970 that involve disputes over lakebed ownership where the courts reference the
public trust doctrine.
93 508 N.W.2d at 782.
94 Id. at 783.
95 Id. at 784.
96 Id. at 784, 787.
97 See Pratt v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1981); Nelson v. De Long, 7
N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 1942).
98 Larson, 508 N.W.2d at 787.
99

Id.

100

No. A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012).

101

Id.; Our Children’s Trust, Legal Action, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/Legal (last visited

Apr. 17, 2015).
102
103
104

Aronow, 2012 WL 4476642, at *1.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *2.
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Thus, the court found no legal basis to expand the public trust doctrine
beyond its application to navigable waters and submerged lands.105
Notably, because each of these cases was an attempt to expand the
scope of the public trust doctrine beyond the resources it traditionally
protects, one wonders why the plaintiffs in each case did not bring a MERA
claim rather than a public trust claim. Although each plaintiff likely would
have had other difficulties establishing liability under MERA, both the land
and the air are statutorily defined “natural resources” subject to protection
under the statute, thus providing a much more straightforward vehicle for
relief than the common law public trust doctrine.106 However, in the case
attempting to apply the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere, the goal of
the litigation was to develop the common law doctrine on a nationwide basis
as a means of supporting efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions.107 A
similar effort using MERA in Minnesota would not necessarily aid that
nationwide endeavor.

B. White Bear Lake Restoration Association v. Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources
As illustrated above, Minnesota courts have developed a significant
body of case law interpreting MERA and virtually no post-1971 case law
interpreting the scope or application of the public trust doctrine in the state
apart from the two decisions by Minnesota intermediate appellate courts
declining to extend the doctrine beyond water-based resources without
Minnesota Supreme Court case law to support it. Thus, there are few
appellate decisions in Minnesota addressing how the public trust doctrine
can be used to protect traditional, water-based resources or balance
development against natural resource protection.108 Instead, disputes over
balancing economic development and natural resource protection in the
context of both water-based resources and other natural resources have all
been channeled into MERA claims. There are no published cases where a
plaintiff asserted claims under both MERA and the public trust doctrine, and
thus no Minnesota decision addressing the interplay between the state’s
environmental rights statute and the common law public trust doctrine.

105
106

Id.

Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. 116B.02 (West 2014); cf. Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (noting that, in another statutory context,
statutory schemes can “rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law
protections”).
107 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 54, Aronow v. State, 2012 WL
4476642 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2015) (No. A12-0585) (“Together with the State’s common law
duty under the Public Trust Doctrine, MERA compels the State of Minnesota . . . to safeguard
the atmosphere for the future enjoyment of Minnesotans . . . .”).
108 See Eastern Comparative Guide, supra note 33, at 71–73 (summarizing Minnesota case
law); Sherry A. Enzler et al., Finding a Path to Sustainable Water Management: Where We’ve
Been, Where We Need to Go, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 842, 854–56 (2013) (discussing public
trust doctrine cases in Minnesota).
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However, in 2012, in White Bear Lake Restoration Association, two
plaintiff groups representing businesses and homeowners along the shores
of White Bear Lake in Ramsey County, Minnesota, approximately ten miles
northeast of St. Paul, sued the Minnesota DNR asserting claims under both
MERA and the public trust doctrine for failure to take action to prevent
declines of water levels in the 2,400-acre lake—one of the largest and
deepest lakes in the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan area.109 The White
Bear Lake Restoration Association (Restoration Association) represented
businesses that used and were dependent on the lake.110 The White Bear
Lake Homeowners’ Association (Homeowners’ Association) represented
residents who lived in the area of the lake.111 The Restoration Association
was the original plaintiff and brought solely MERA claims.112 The
Homeowners’ Association subsequently intervened in the case supporting
the existing MERA claims and included a new claim under the common law
public trust doctrine.113
The lake supported swimming, boating, waterskiing, fishing, wildlife
habitat, and various recreational businesses.114 The lake had a small
watershed, which means there was a limited surface area around the lake
from which precipitation runoff flowed into the lake.115 The only other water
source that recharged the lake was groundwater from the underlying Prairie
du Chien-Jordan aquifer.116 While Minneapolis, St. Paul, and other
surrounding communities received surface water from the Mississippi River
to meet their municipal water needs,117 many other municipalities in the
109

Settlement Agreement, supra note 18, 1–2. See Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., Fisheries
Survey, White Bear Lake, http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/lakefind/showreport.html?
downum=82016700 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (providing a description of White Bear Lake);
Dana Thiede, KARE, Settlement Announced in White Bear Lake Lawsuit, http://www.kare11.
com/story/news/local/2014/12/01/settlement-announced-in-white-bear-lake-lawsuit/19737955/
(last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that White Bear Lake is one of the largest and deepest lakes
in the Twin Cities metropolitan area).
110 Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 25.
111 Complaint in Intervention of White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n ¶5, White Bear Lake
Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (May 2, 2013).
112 Settlement Agreement, supra note 18, at 1–2.
113 Id. at 2.
114 Summary Judgment Order Memorandum, supra note 21, at 8; Complaint in Intervention,
supra note 111, at 7–8; Intervenor/Plaintiff White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.’s
Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, White Bear Lake
Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (April 7, 2014).
115 Summary Judgment Order Memorandum, supra note 21, at 3; Complaint in Intervention,
supra note 111, at 3.
116 Summary Judgment Order Memorandum, supra note 21, at 3; Complaint in Intervention,
supra note 111, at 3–4.
117 See City of St. Paul, Minn., Water Service Facts, http://www.stpaul.gov/index
.aspx?NID=502 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that St. Paul has the capacity to pump 90
million gallons per day from the Mississippi River); City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Water
Facts, http://www.minneapolismn.gov/publicworks/water/water_waterfacts (last visited Apr. 17,
2015) (listing the Mississippi River as the “sole source” of Minneapolis water); Metro. Council,
St. Paul and White Bear Lake: A Strong Water Supply Match, http://www.metrocouncil
.org/News-Events/Wastewater-Water/Newsletters/St-Paul-and-White-Bear-Lake-a-strong-watersupply.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).

Lake
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region obtained their water through high-capacity municipal wells drawing
water from the aquifer pursuant to permits issued by DNR.118 Between 2003
and 2011, precipitation in the White Bear Lake area was at or near a thirtyyear average, while during that same time period water levels in White Bear
Lake dropped, as much as five feet, to their lowest recorded level.119
In 2011, the U.S. Geological Survey conducted a study on the
relationship between groundwater and surface water near White Bear Lake
and focused on pumping by ten municipalities in the area of White Bear
Lake.120 This report found a more than five-foot decline in the water levels of
White Bear Lake between 2003 and 2010 and concluded that significantly
increased municipal groundwater withdrawals from the area around the lake
through high-capacity wells was a significant factor in the decline of water
levels.121 Despite these reports as well as concerns voiced by residents and
government agencies over the lake’s continued decline, at the time the
plaintiffs filed their complaints, DNR had not considered the cumulative
impact of the groundwater withdrawals on the lake in making decisions
regarding individual groundwater withdrawal permits, had not set a
protected elevation for the lake, and had not implemented any other
procedures to prevent drawdown of the aquifer or otherwise protect the
lake.122
In their complaints, the plaintiffs alleged that significant increases in
water appropriations by high-capacity wells, including high-capacity
municipal wells, had caused the decrease in lake levels rather than any
changes in precipitation.123 The plaintiffs also alleged that there were feasible
and prudent alternatives to continuing to allow increased groundwater
pumping including: 1) augmenting public water supplies with surface water
from the St. Paul Regional Water Service and reducing high-capacity water
appropriations to pre-2000 levels; 2) substantially limiting groundwater
withdrawals from targeted wells that have the greatest impact on the lake; 3)
enacting and enforcing heightened water conservation practices in the
affected area; or 4) augmenting lake levels with water from the Mississippi
River.124
Both plaintiffs brought claims under section 116B.03 of MERA, alleging
that DNR: 1) violated state environmental quality standards by issuing new
groundwater withdrawal permits, and failing to terminate or modify existing
permits in the area surrounding the lake; and, 2) engaged in conduct that
resulted in a material adverse effect on the lake in violation of MERA
separate and apart from any violation of an environmental quality

118 Summary Judgment Order, supra note 21, at 3–4; Complaint in Intervention, supra note
105, at 4–5.
119 Summary Judgment Order, supra note 21, at 6–8; Complaint in Intervention, supra note
111, at 5.
120 Summary Judgment Order, supra note 21, at 4.
121 Id. at 6–8.
122 Id. at 8.
123 Complaint in Intervention, supra note 111, at 5.
124 Complaint in Intervention, supra note 111, at 8–9.
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standard.125 The Homeowners’ Association also brought a separate public
trust doctrine claim, alleging that the state and DNR were trustees of the
state’s public water resources—including the lake, the water, and the
lakebed—and that DNR’s actions and inactions had caused the impairment
and destruction of the lake in breach of their obligations under the public
trust doctrine.126
Before the case settled in December 2014, on terms discussed below,
DNR brought a motion to dismiss the claims and, when the court denied that
motion, all parties brought motions for summary judgment on various
claims.127 These motions resulted in two decisions by the Ramsey County
District Court.128 Because the focus of this Article is on the public trust
doctrine, the parties’ arguments and the court’s decisions on the MERA
claims will not be discussed except as they relate to the public trust doctrine
claim.
In its motion to dismiss the public trust doctrine claim, DNR argued
first that the Homeowners’ Association was attempting to expand the
doctrine to cover groundwater and cited the Larson and Aronow cases to
show that Minnesota courts had rejected efforts to expand the doctrine to
include additional resources beyond navigable waterways and their beds.129
DNR then argued that the Homeowners’ Association could not bring a public
trust doctrine claim to protect the lake when the challenged action was
providing domestic water, which is a public use also protected by the public
trust doctrine.130 In other words, so long as public trust assets are used for a
public good—here domestic consumption—there cannot be a public trust
doctrine violation.131 DNR relied on a 1947 Minnesota case, State v. Longyear
Holding Co. (Longyear),132 where the state sought to establish its rights of
ownership to the ore below the low water mark of a lake and to establish
that riparian owners had no interest in those minerals so the state could
drain the lake and mine the ore.133 The court in Longyear held that the state
owned the bed of the lake, the temporary draining did not operate to
transfer title to the riparian owners, and mining the ore was in the interest of

125 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 2, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-132414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 11, 2013).
126 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, supra note 125, at 11–13.
127 Id.; Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, ex
rel. State of Minn.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 2014); Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motions
to Dismiss, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 18,
2013).
128 Motion to Dismiss Order, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. June 18, 2013); Motion to Dismiss Order, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 2013).
129 Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motions to Dismiss, supra note 127, at
28–29.
130 Id. at 29.
131 Id. at 29–30.
132 Id. at 30; 29 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1947).
133 Longyear, 29 N.W.2d at 661, 662.
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the public and did not violate the public trust doctrine.134 Thus, according to
DNR, the public trust doctrine operated solely as “a real estate doctrine” that
limits the state’s ability to transfer or dispose of beds of navigable waters.135
DNR bolstered its arguments with reference to Minnesota water statutes,
which stated that domestic consumption is a high priority use of water but
did not specify any priority of maintaining lake elevations.136 Thus, these
legislative declarations displaced any common law public trust doctrine
protections.137
In response, the Homeowners’ Association argued that the public trust
doctrine was an independent check on legislative priorities for public trust
resources.138 The Homeowners’ Association also relied on modern
environmental protection statutes in Minnesota and the development of the
public trust doctrine in other states to argue that the public trust doctrine in
Minnesota was not frozen in time in 1947, but instead had expanded to
include modern environmental protection priorities reflected in state
statutes as well as public trust doctrine developments elsewhere in the
country.139 It further contended that statutes in Minnesota as well as
environmental science undermined DNR’s efforts to deny the connection
between surface water and groundwater, and that DNR’s actions with regard
to groundwater withdrawals were what was causing the destruction of the
lake itself—a protected public trust resource—resulting in a breach of the
state’s duty to protect that resource under the doctrine.140
The district court denied DNR’s motion to dismiss the public trust
doctrine claim.141 It found that the “relationship between lake levels and the
aquifer are inexorably entwined” and thus the public trust doctrine claim
easily encompassed established public trust resources including the lake, its
use as a navigable waterway, and the impacts of the depletion of the lake on
fish and wildlife.142 The court also found, citing Illinois Central, that the
public trust doctrine “serves as a check upon legislative and regulatory
actions involving assets held in public trust.”143 Finally, the court, citing to
MERA’s savings clause, stated that MERA and other environmental
protection legislation have “reinforced the public trust concept, but have not
supplanted it.”144 The court also rejected DNR’s argument that there could be
no public trust violation if the water was used for domestic, and thus public,
purposes and found that the complaint properly alleged that DNR had failed

134

Id. at 665, 667, 670.

135

Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motions to Dismiss at 14, White Bear

Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 11, 2013).
136

Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motions to Dismiss, supra note 127, at 30.

137

Id. at 30–31.

138

Intervenor’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4, White

Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 3, 2013).
139 Id. at 11–13.
140 Id. at 10–11, 14–16.
141 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, supra note 125, at 2.
142 Id. at 11.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 12.
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in its duty as trustee of a public asset—the lake—in granting excessive water
withdrawal permits and could pursue that claim.145
After significant discovery, all parties moved for summary judgment on
various aspects of the MERA and public trust doctrine claims.146 On the
public trust doctrine claim, DNR argued first that there was no evidence the
lake was used for commerce or was otherwise navigable at the time of
statehood in 1858 and thus it was not owned by the state or protected under
the public trust doctrine.147 DNR also argued that the public trust doctrine
did not provide an affirmative cause of action in Minnesota and that “[n]o
Minnesota court has held that an affirmative cause of action is implied in the
public trust doctrine.”148 DNR argued that the Homeowners’ Association
could not rely on both MERA and the public trust doctrine and that “if the
Homeowners’ Association is relying on MERA for jurisdiction, its public
trust doctrine ‘claim’ must be dismissed.”149 It argued, in addition, that courts
in Minnesota had not expanded the doctrine to include groundwater and
Minnesota courts “have repeatedly declined to expand the public trust
doctrine,” citing Aronow, Larson, and Longyear.150 Finally, DNR argued that
even if it owned the bed of the lake, Minnesota’s public trust doctrine did not
impose any obligation on the state to manage navigable waters over the
lakebed to protect public trust uses.151 Instead, the doctrine only protects
trust uses by imposing a “limitation on the State’s ability to transfer or
dispose of the beds of navigable waters.”152 Throughout its briefs, DNR stated
again and again that there was no Minnesota case law to support even the

145 See id. at 12–13 (“[The claim] addresses the public interest in protecting White Bear lake
as well as the association members’ riparian rights . . . .”).
146 Summary Judgment Order Memorandum, supra note 21, at 2.
147 See Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 22–23 (arguing that the intervenors needed to show that
the “lake was used, or was susceptible of being used . . . as a highway for commerce”).
148 Id. at 23.
149 Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 20, at 17.
150 Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 20, at 24–25 (citing Aronow v. State, A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012); Larson v. Sando, 508 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)); Minn.
Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 20, at 19–20 (citing State v. Longyear Holding Co., 29 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Minn. 1947);
Larson, 508 N.W.2d at 787); Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Memorandum Opposing White Bear
Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3–6, White Bear Lake
Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014) (citing Longyear, 29 N.W.2d
at 669 and Larson, 508 N.W.2d at 787).
151 See Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 18–19, 24 (explaining that regardless of DNR’s limited
authority in comparison to a landowner, the Minnesota “public trust doctrine is essentially a
real estate doctrine that operates as a limitation on the State’s ability to transfer or dispose of
the beds of navigable waters”).
152 Id. at 24.
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most basic application of the public trust doctrine to protect any water
resources or limit DNR’s actions with regard to those water resources.153
In its own motion for summary judgment, the Homeowners’ Association
provided evidence establishing that the lake was navigable at the time of
statehood because it was susceptible for use in travel and commercial
navigation at and before that time.154 Original surveys of the lake showed it
as a meandered lake approximately the same size as existed when
steamboats began to be used on the lake in the late 1800s and a tourist
industry developed around the lake.155 The Homeowners’ Association argued
that DNR had an affirmative duty to consider and balance any negative
impact of its actions on the lake under the public trust doctrine even though
Minnesota courts had not directly addressed the issue.156 It also argued that
the facts were undisputed that DNR’s actions had impacted lake levels,
threatened the public trust interests in the lake, and thus violated the public
trust doctrine.157
In its order on summary judgment in 2014, the court denied the bulk of
the parties’ motions on MERA and the public trust doctrine on grounds that
there were material facts in dispute regarding the impact of groundwater
pumping on lake levels; pollution, impairment, or destruction of natural
resources associated with the lake; the diligence of DNR in protecting those
resources; whether DNR violated environmental standards in issuing the
groundwater appropriation permits; and the appropriate remedy.158 However,
the court did grant in part the Homeowners’ Association motion for
summary judgment on the public trust doctrine.159 The court found there was
sufficient evidence to establish that the lake was navigable-in-fact at the time
of statehood and that the public trust doctrine imposed an obligation on
DNR to protect and preserve not only the bed of the lake but also its surface
waters.160 Thus, the court granted summary judgment for the Homeowners’
Association on “the question of whether the public trust doctrine affords a
common law cause of action to protect the public’s use rights to the water
and lakebed of White Bear Lake.”161 Nevertheless, the court denied summary
judgment based on disputes of fact regarding whether DNR’s management of

153 See id.; Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 19–20; Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Memorandum
Opposing White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 150 at 3–6.
154 Intervenor/Plaintiff White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.’s Memorandum in Support
of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 114, at 9, 21.
155 Id. at 21–22.
156 Id. at 25.
157 Intervenor/Plaintiff White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.’s Reply Memorandum in
Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 1, 2014).
158 Summary Judgment Order Memorandum, supra note 21, at 6–12.
159 Id. at 12.
160 Id. at 13–15.
161 Id. at 16.
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the resource and management of groundwater appropriation permits in fact
violated its fiduciary duty under the public trust doctrine.162
Then, in December 2014, the parties reached a settlement that would
stay the litigation for three years while they attempted to develop an areawide solution to water management.163 Under the agreement, DNR and the
city of White Bear Lake would support a plan to develop a surface water
supply for cities around the lake.164 During the first phase, six municipalities
would receive surface water at a cost of $155 million to $230 million.165 “The
DNR would support legislation to fund feasibility and design considerations
by August 2016, with the target for full construction funding in 2017.”166 In a
second phase, seven other municipalities would move to using surface
water.167 “The DNR would determine and set a ‘protective elevation’ for
White Bear Lake by November 1, 2016.”168 This elevation would not be
required until the first phase of the water-supply project was complete, at
which time it could be used to regulate new groundwater permits.169 DNR
and the two plaintiff groups would work to persuade residents to reduce
water use with an overall goal of a 17% reduction.170 As part of the
agreement, DNR did not admit that the primary cause of the drop in the
lake’s water level was associated with groundwater pumping.171
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW IN THE SHADOW OF STATUTES
The question in this Part is whether there are any broad lessons to be
learned from the public trust doctrine experience in Minnesota. On the one
hand, Professor Sax’s vision for the public trust doctrine created the
momentum to enact a unique and powerful environmental rights statute in
Minnesota. Plaintiffs have used the statute effectively and very successfully
for forty years to protect natural resources and create a substantive role for
the courts in reviewing both public and private development projects that

162
163

Id.
See Stipulation for Stay, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn.

Dist. Ct. Dec. 16, 2014).
164 Jim Anderson, White Bear Lake Settlement Pushes Plan to Divert Water from Mississippi,
STAR TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 2014, http://www.startribune.com/local/east/284350031.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2015); Debra O’Connor, White Bear Lake Agreement Would Pump Mississippi Water to
13 Suburbs, PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 1, 2014, http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_27043916
/white-bear-lake-groups-settle-dnr-over-water (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); Elizabeth Dunbar,
White Bear Lake Settlement Hinges on Legislature, MPR NEWS, Dec. 1, 2014,
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/12/01/wbl-water-levels (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); Mark
Wolski, Minnesota, White Bear Lake Settle Lawsuit Over Lake’s Decreasing Water Levels, 232
DAILY ENVT. REP. Dec. 3, 2014, http://news.bna.com/deln/DELNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid
=59855728&vname=dennotallissues&jd=a0f9u1p7y3&split=0 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
165 O’Connor, supra note 164.
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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would impact natural resources well beyond what could be accomplished
solely with environmental review laws such as the National Environmental
Policy Act172 or, Minnesota’s version, the Minnesota Environmental Policy
Act,173 which provide only procedural and not substantive remedies.
Moreover, MERA’s broad definition of “natural resources” means plaintiffs
do not need to convince courts to expand the resources protected by the
public trust doctrine beyond traditional navigable waters and submerged
lands. The statute clearly encompasses a broad range of natural resources
including land, air, animals, wildlife habitat, historic buildings, and aesthetic
resources.
Nevertheless, has Minnesota lost anything because litigants in the state
have channeled all their natural resource protection litigation through
MERA, essentially leaving the public trust doctrine in its pre-1971 condition?
There are good arguments that it has. Indeed, in many areas of
environmental law, common law and statutes can work and have worked
together cooperatively in a manner that allows one to enhance the other for
environmental protection purposes.174 For instance, there is strong evidence
that courts began to more frequently apply common law strict liability to
actions causing environmental harm on land after Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA).175 One explanation for this shift is that courts had
become comfortable applying the statutory strict liability provisions in
CERCLA to environmental contamination cases. Thus, it was only a small
step to apply strict liability to environmental contamination cases that
involved common law claims as well as CERCLA claims and find that
activities resulting in environmental contamination were “abnormally
dangerous,” justifying common law strict liability.176 These cases, moreover,
were decided at a time when courts were otherwise refusing to expand the
boundaries of activities considered “abnormally dangerous” under strict
liability to new activities, choosing instead to require plaintiffs to prove
negligence.177
However, CERCLA was able to impact the development of common law
because litigants continue to need the common law to obtain monetary

172
173

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012).
Minnesota Environmental Policy Act of 1973, Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 116D.01–.07 (West

2014).
174 See Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on
Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 961–62 (2004)
[hereinafter Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation] (suggesting that courts have expanded

application of common law strict liability in environmental contamination cases based on the
policies, principles, and legislative history of statutes like CERCLA that apply strict liability in
similar factual circumstances); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of
the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 547 (2007) [hereinafter Klass, Common Law and
Federalism].
175 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
176 Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation, supra note 174, at 957–58, 961.
177 Id. at 934–35, 961.
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damages in contamination cases along with equitable CERCLA relief.178 In
other words, plaintiffs could not rely just on CERCLA if they sought to
recover diminution in value to property, lost profits, or punitive damages in
addition to the cleanup costs they could recover under CERCLA. As a result,
plaintiffs frequently brought the two sets of claims together,179 thus allowing
common law doctrine to develop alongside CERCLA.
The same is true with the relationship between nuisance lawsuits and
the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. Certainly, after the enactment of
these powerful statutes in the 1970s, plaintiffs filed fewer nuisance lawsuits
to resolve air and water pollution cases.180 Nevertheless, there were still
cases where plaintiffs sought to recover monetary damages associated with
such pollution, and thus courts were in a position to consider these common
law claims against the backdrop of Congress’s new policy pronouncements
on clean air and clean water.181 And, of course, when concerns about climate
change rose to prominence after 2000, private plaintiffs once again looked to
nuisance law as a major legal tool because the existing federal
environmental statutes were not readily available for private litigation even
if they were able to serve as a basis for EPA regulation.182
In contrast to other areas of environmental law where statutes and
common law can work together to provide complementary remedies and
where common law can fill in the holes in the statutes, with MERA, why ever
bring a public trust doctrine case? Only injunctive relief is available under
either the common law or MERA, so common law in this instance doesn’t
provide any additional remedy.183 Looking back with a perspective of forty
years, this reliance on MERA means that the common law never developed
in Minnesota. Notably, unlike nuisance law, which has a long history of
being used for environmental protection purposes, the public trust doctrine
has been used for environmental protection purposes across the country
only since the time MERA was enacted in 1970,184 so there was no earlier
case law to draw on like the situation with nuisance in the air and water
context or nuisance, trespass, and strict liability in the land contamination
context.
Does it matter? It does. As powerful as it is, MERA does have
limitations not found in the public trust doctrine. MERA suits cannot be
brought against private parties or local governments acting under a state
permit.185 There are statutory affirmative defenses that may not exist in the

178
179

Id. at 905.
See id. at 905, 946 (“Thus, claims for common law strict liability remain a crucial element

of a plaintiff’s case, even if a statutory cause of action exists under state law, federal law, or
both.”).
180 See, e.g., Klass, Common Law and Federalism, supra note 174, at 574 (describing the
decline of the use of state common law claims to recover for environmental harm in favor of
greater reliance on the new federal statutes enacted in the 1970s and 1980s).
181 Klass, Common Law and Federalism, supra note 174, at 583–84.
182
183
184
185

Id.
See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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common law.186 Moreover, state legislatures can and do amend statutes to
make them less protective of natural resources and the environment. There
is no guarantee that the Minnesota legislature will not at some point amend
MERA to limit its ability to protect natural resources. The same is true for
executive branch administrative agencies. Courts must give deference under
administrative law principles to agencies interpreting statutes and
regulations187 and that deference may result in reduced protection for natural
resources. But the public trust doctrine is a vehicle for the courts to ensure
that the state fulfills its common law obligation to protect natural resources
even if legislative and executive branch sentiments are otherwise.
Most important, MERA can only be used offensively to stop private or
government action that may adversely impact natural resources.188 MERA
cannot be used to defend government action to protect the environment in
the face of private party challenges such as regulatory takings claims. The
public trust doctrine, however, can be used and has frequently been used
defensively by the government to support its efforts to protect the
environment. There are numerous examples in states including Louisiana,
Hawaii, California, Washington, Virginia, Wisconsin, New York, and Ohio
where state courts upheld state actions to protect or preserve wetlands,
lakes, groundwater, coastal areas, and other protected public trust resources
from claims by developers and private landowners that the state action was
arbitrary and capricious or resulted in a taking of private property without
just compensation.189 In each case, the court, using the public trust doctrine
on its own or in combination with state environmental protection statutes,
upheld the state action on grounds that the state was required to or at least
permitted to take such action to preserve public trust resources.190

186 See, e.g., Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02, subdiv. 2
(West 2014) (excluding family farms and family farm corporations from entities subject to suit
under MERA); id. § 116B.03, subdiv. 1 (excluding MERA actions against people acting pursuant
to a permit or license issued by specified state agencies); id. § 116B.04 (stating that a defendant
may rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case by showing no feasible or prudent alternative to the
proposed conduct).
187 See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
188 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116B.03 (providing for a civil action to protect natural resources
from pollution, impairment, or destruction, but providing no mechanism for governments to use
the statute as a defense when their efforts to preserve natural resources interfere with private
property rights).
189 Klass, supra note 9, at 734–42 (discussing cases where courts found state or local action
to deny a permit or to take action was either not a taking or not arbitrary and capricious). See
also Melissa K. Scanlan, Shifting Sands: A Meta-Theory for Public Access and Private Property
Along the Coast, 65 S.C. L. REV. 295, 350–53 (2013) (discussing role of the public trust doctrine
in takings claims); see generally Robin Kundis Craig, What the Public Trust Doctrine Can Teach
Us About the Police Power, Penn Central, and the Public Interest in Natural Resource
Regulation (forthcoming 2015) (discussing role of the public trust doctrine in regulatory takings
cases).
190 See generally Klass, supra note 9, at 734–37, 741 (discussing cases upholding government
actions to prevent private development that would adversely impact protected resources and
rejecting arguments by plaintiffs that such government actions were arbitrary and capricious or
constituted a taking).
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It is this role for the public trust doctrine that makes DNR’s position in
the White Bear Lake Restoration Association case so troubling. Certainly, in
that case, a broad reading of the public trust doctrine was against DNR’s
short-term interests in retaining maximum flexibility to make water
allocation decisions. However, by arguing for an extremely narrow view of
the public trust doctrine, DNR was potentially harming its long-term
interests to the extent it might wish in the future to protect a wetland,
natural area, lake, or other natural resources from private development or
appropriation. DNR’s arguments that the public trust doctrine is merely a
“real estate doctrine” that has no role in natural resources protection may
not be helpful in future cases where it denies a development permit to
preserve a wetland or undertakes comprehensive regulation of the state’s
resources in a manner that impacts private property rights.
DNR was indeed correct in its briefs in the litigation that there was no
Minnesota case law declaring citizens can sue under the public trust
doctrine to protect natural resources, that groundwater is protected, or for
any other aspect of the public trust doctrine that supported the plaintiffs’
claims in the case.191 That is because there is very little Minnesota case law
on the topic at all. The Ramsey County District Court decisions are a good
start, and the strong savings clause in MERA itself is extremely helpful,192 but
if the case settlement remains in effect, there will continue to be no
controlling authority in the state on the ability to use the public trust
doctrine to protect natural resources as opposed to it being merely a real
estate doctrine.
In a 1986 article on the public trust doctrine, Professor Richard Lazarus
warned environmental protection advocates and scholars not to place too
much emphasis on the public trust doctrine lest it undermine efforts to
create new natural resource protection frameworks through legislative and
regulatory action.193 But this warning is also valid in reverse. Statutes are
great. Except when they’re not. There are affirmative defenses in MERA.194 It
cannot be used for actions on agricultural lands.195 MERA litigation is

191 See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motions to Dismiss, supra note 127, at
28–31; Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motions to Dismiss, supra note 135,
at 10–11, 14; Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Memorandum Opposing White Bear Lake Homeowners’
Ass’n, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 3–6; Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res.
Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 16, 19.
192 See Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.12 (West 2014) (“No
existing civil or criminal remedy for any wrongful action shall be excluded or impaired by
sections 116B.01 to 116B.13. The rights and remedies provided herein shall be in addition to any
administrative, regulatory, statutory, or common law rights and remedies now or hereafter
available.”).
193 Lazarus, supra note 25, at 657–58, 692.
194 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02, subdiv. 2 (excluding family farms and family farm
corporations from entities subject to suit under MERA); id. § 116B.03, subdiv. 1 (excluding
MERA actions against persons acting pursuant to a permit or license issued by specified state
agencies); id. § 116B.04 (stating that a defendant may rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case by
showing no feasible or prudent alternative to the proposed conduct).
195 Id. § 116B.03.
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expensive.196 It does not allow for recovery of attorneys’ fees and plaintiffs
will almost always need expensive experts to withstand summary judgment
and prevail at trial.197 More important, however, there are few reasons to be
optimistic about legislative sources of environmental protection in today’s
current political climate. At least at the federal level, the legislative scene
looks quite different today in 2014 than it did in 1986 when Professor
Lazarus wrote his article. In the late 1980s and even through much of the
1990s, many environmental protection issues were bipartisan in nature.198
Congress enacted significant amendments to the Clean Air Act and
CERCLA,199 and climate change had not yet become the politically polarizing
issue it is today. Likewise, many state legislatures continued to enact
significant environmental protection legislation,200 renewable portfolio
standards,201 and energy efficiency legislation202 even up until a few years ago.
At the present moment, however, much of that legislative effort is stalled203
and a vibrant common law, even an old doctrine like the public trust
doctrine, may be of use, at least for a time.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article explores the relationship between state environmental
rights statutes and the common law public trust doctrine to consider
whether there remains a role for the common law to protect natural
resources even in states where strong environmental rights statutes exist.
Environmental rights statutes and the common law public trust doctrine can
and should work together to protect natural resources. The Minnesota

196 Michael Wietecki, True Access to the Courts for Citizens Working to Protect Natural
Resources: Incorporating Attorney’s Fees into the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 14 MO.

ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 149 (2006) (asserting that the cost of litigation is prohibitive due to
the absence of a provision allowing plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees).
197 Id. at 148.
198 Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law at the Crossroads: Looking Back 25, Looking
Forward 25, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 267, 268 (2013).
199 Id. at 270–72.
200 See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 4, at 583 (summarizing state environmental legislation in the
1980s and 1990s).
201 Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is There a “Race” and Is it to the
“Top”?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. OF CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 3 (2011–12) (discussing rapid enactment of state
renewable portfolio standard); see also Database of State Incentives for Renewables and
Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, available at http://ncsolarcenprod.s3.amazonaws
.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/RPS_map.pdf (map showing renewable portfolio standards in
the states).
202 See Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, Energy Efficiency
Resource Standards, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/maps (interactive map
showing energy efficiency resource standards in the states).
203 See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Introduction: Environmental Law Without Congress, 46 J. LAND
USE & ENVT’L L. 1 (Sept./Oct. 2014) (describing Congress’s failure to address current
environmental problems); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE
LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (Yale U. Press 2013) (describing recent attacks on environmental and
public health laws).
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example of MERA illustrates that MERA is a powerful statute that has
played an important role in natural resources protection in the state for over
forty years. Hopefully MERA will continue to play that role long into the
future. But during those same forty years, litigants in Minnesota have
ignored the public trust doctrine in a way that is harmful to environmental
protection in the state. Because of the lack of developed public trust
doctrine case law, there are potentially fewer tools available to protect
natural resources, even traditional public trust resources like navigable
waters. This is particularly true in cases where MERA’s application may be
limited or where the state wishes to protect such resources and can use the
common law public trust doctrine as a shield against regulatory takings
claims. The White Bear Lake Restoration Association case provides a good
example of how litigants can use the public trust doctrine in conjunction
with MERA to protect natural resources. Hopefully future plaintiffs will
encourage courts in Minnesota and elsewhere to develop a more robust
common law public trust doctrine to support existing environmental
protection statutes and regulations.

